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MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCIES AS INSTITUTIONAL AGENTS:  
STRATEGIES FOR CREATING AND SUSTAINING INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPITAL 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Management consultants have long been recognized as carriers of management knowledge 
and disseminators of management fashions. While it is well understood how they promote 
the acceptance of their concepts, surprisingly little has been said about their strategies to 
promote the acceptability of their services. In this paper, we elaborate a typology of 
strategies by which management consultancies can create and sustain such “institutional 
capital” (Oliver, 1997) that helps them extract competitive resources from their institutional 
context. Drawing on examples from the German consulting industry, we show how localized 
competitive actions can enhance individual firm‟s positions, but also the collective 
institutional capital of the consulting industry as a whole, legitimizing consulting services in 
broader sectors of society and facilitating access to requisite resources. Our accounts counter 
prevailing imagery of institutional entrepreneurship as individualistic, “heroic” action and 
demonstrate how distributed, embedded actors can collectively shape the institutional 
context from within to enhance their institutional capital.   
 
Keywords: consulting industry, neoinstitutionalism, institutional capital, embedded 
agency, institutional strategy 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Management consultancies have gained strong economic and social influence as the 
new “market protagonists” (Faust (2002b, 45)) in increasingly knowledge-intensive and 
dynamic economies. The largest consultancies rival multinational corporations in turnover 
and employment (Empson (2007b); Greenwood, Suddaby and McDougald (2006b)) and 
serve clients in business, politics and non-profit sectors (Niejahr and Bittner (2004)). As 
exemplars of knowledge-intensive firms (e.g. Armbrüster (2006); Empson (2001); Morris 
(2001)) they provide clients with external expert knowledge where they at least temporarily 
struggle to keep up with current trends and achieve business success (McKenna (2006)). The 
constant stream of innovations they produce serves their clients, but also positions 
consultancies as thought leaders and creates continued demand for their advice (Ernst and 
Kieser (2002b, c); Fincham and Clark (2002)). 
Studies of management fashions (Abrahamson (1996); Benders and van Veen 
(2001); Kieser (1997); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)) suggest that management 
consultancies strategically criticize existing concepts to re-shape the market for management 
knowledge and establish their own innovations as sources of commercial success. This self-
marketing seeks to orient management discourse in a direction that legitimizes specific 
products and processes as rational and effective (Berglund and Werr (2000)). In this view, 
the rise of management consulting is not a mere product of economic needs. It results at 
least partially from consultancy firms‟ rhetorical strategies to shape management discourse, 
develop a reputation as thought leaders, and establish their concepts as appropriate remedies 
for a range of management problems.  
The centrality of market discourse, reputation, and perceived legitimacy in the 
marketing of consulting services suggests that their competitive success largely feeds on the 
institutional capital (Oliver (1997)) held individually by different consultancies as well as 
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collectively by the industry as a whole. Oliver (1997) defines institutional capital “as the 
firm‟s capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies” through the 
“effective management of the firm's resource decision context” (p. 709). In this sense, an 
organization‟s institutional capital is the greater, the more its embeddedness in – and active 
management of – its institutional context facilitates the acquisition, creation, and 
improvement of superior resources. Such institutionally contingent resources may include 
legitimacy, reputation or client relationships that, in turn, underpin the competitive 
advantage of consultancies. Strategies for managing the institutional context so as to create 
or sustain institutional capital are, hence, vital for consultancy firms‟ success. 
Over the last two decades, institutional theorists have developed some understanding 
of how organizations can act strategically within their institutional environments (Oliver 
(1991)) or transform them altogether (DiMaggio (1988); Lawrence (1999); Maguire, Hardy 
and Lawrence (2004)). Studies on “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio (1988); 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a)) have begun to uncover how actors become motivated and 
enabled to manipulate the very institutional structures that they inhabit.1  
While the innovative activity of management consultancies has recently been 
identified as a form of institutional entrepreneurship, this has only been with regard to the 
institutional conditions under which their clients operate (Walgenbach (2002)). Some studies 
have focused on the role of management consultancies as fashion setters who actively create 
isomorphic pressures in their client industries (Kieser (1997); Suddaby and Greenwood 
(2001)). Others investigated the use of rationality myths in service delivery processes 
(Armbrüster (2004); Bäcklund and Werr (2001); Berglund and Werr (2000)) or analyzed 
different socio-cultural and historical influences on the emergence of the consultancy 
industry (Faust (2002b); Kipping (2002); Kipping and Armbrüster (2002)). Nonetheless, an 
                                                                
1 For a review of the literature see Garud et al. (2007) and Hardy et al. (2008).  
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explicit analysis of the strategies by which consultancy firms may manipulate the 
institutional ramifications of their own existence and operation is generally missing.  
To address this shortcoming, we elaborate a typology of strategies by which 
management consultancies can create or sustain their institutional capital. Drawing on 
strategic approaches to institutions (Bresser and Millonig (2003); Lawrence (1999); Oliver 
(1991)), and illustrative evidence from the German consulting market, we identify a set of 
five interrelated strategies by which consultancies can manipulate their external environment 
and enhance their competitiveness on the level of the industry, the strategic group, and the 
individual firm.  
Based on recent institutionalist discussions of embedded (Greenwood and Suddaby 
(2006a)) and distributed (Quack (2007)) agency we specify the enabling conditions and 
specific nature of these strategies. Hence, we not only contribute to understanding the 
strategic repertoire of management consultancies. We also advance institutional theory by 
demonstrating how institutional change is the collective and emergent product of distributed 
actors‟ localized efforts to enhance their individual competitive position.  
The paper is organized in three parts: The first part introduces the theoretical 
orientation of the paper, outlining foundations and recent debates in institutional theory as 
well as a repertoire of generic strategies for manipulating institutional environments. The 
second part describes institutional properties of the management consultancy field and, 
using illustrative evidence from the German consulting market, explores how consultancies 
can create and sustain their individual and collective institutional capital. The final 
discussion section develops a typology of consulting-specific institutional strategies, 
discusses their emergent and distributed nature, and points out implications for future 
research.  
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2 THEORETICAL ORIENTATION  
2.1 Foundations of institutional theory 
Institutions, in the broadest sense, represent a collective consensus that classifies a 
social situation. They define the categories and relationships of actors commonly expected 
to be involved and specify the types of ideas and behaviours that are considered acceptable 
in that situation (DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Meyer and Rowan (1977); Meyer and Scott 
(1983); Powell and DiMaggio (1991)). For business organizations this means that they 
compete for “social as well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 150)), as 
their survival and success not only depend on the technical efficiency, but also the perceived 
social appropriateness of their ideas, products, structures and practices. Legitimacy becomes 
a critical resource that organizations must extract from their institutional environment.  
The relevant institutional environment in which legitimacy is conferred has been 
conceptualized as an organizational field (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Scott (1991); 
Scott and Meyer (1983)). It represents a mid-level social sphere in which those stakeholders 
that “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, 149) evaluate the legitimacy of each others‟ actions and connect concrete 
organizational action with broader normative and social structures. Fields progress from an 
“emerging” to a “mature” state as their constituents interact more frequently and develop 
shared meaning systems. Emerging fields are still relatively underorganized domains. They 
revolve around a central “issue” such as recycling (Hoffman (1999)), HIV/AIDS treatment 
(Maguire et al. (2004)) or new technologies (Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy (2002)), but 
their members only interact sporadically and unsystematically. They may recognize some 
degree of mutual interest, but lack institutional roles with widely shared, clear-cut norms 
against which to evaluate their actions. In contrast, mature fields such as healthcare (e.g. 
Brock, Powell and Hinings (1999); Scott, Ruef, Mendel and Caronna (2000)), law (e.g. 
Empson (2007a); Hoffman (1999)) or accounting (e.g. Greenwood, Hinings and Suddaby 
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(2002); Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a)) are characterized by an established regulatory 
framework and common meaning system. Their constituents are aware of their common 
enterprise and stratified into clear structures of inter-organizational coalition and domination 
(DiMaggio and Powell (1983)). In mature fields, organizations are exposed to strong 
isomorphic pressures which force legitimacy-seeking organizations to comply with the 
shared rules and norms of the field (DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Meyer and Rowan 
(1977))  
Isomorphism is the dominant concept of early institutionalism, which leads critics to 
remark that it fosters an overly deterministic image of institutions as reified structures to 
which organizations passively adapt. These critiques lead institutionalists to shift their 
research interest from examining processes of isomorphic convergence to exploring the 
conditions and mechanisms producing divergence in organizational forms and behaviours.  
2.2 Institutional Strategy and Entrepreneurship 
DiMaggio‟s (1988) foundational argument that “new institutions arise when 
organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that 
they value highly” (p. 14) re-oriented institutionalist research towards actors‟ efforts to 
actively shape the socio-political context of their operations to their advantage. Under the 
label of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio (1988); Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a); 
Leca, Battilana and Boxenbaum (2006); Leca and Naccache (2006); Maguire et al. (2004)) 
they investigate strategies by which self-interested actors try to establish “a strategically 
favorable set of conditions” for their organization (Lawrence (1999, 167)).  
While Oliver (1991) provides a repertoire of strategic responses to existing 
institutional pressures, Suchman (1995) and Lawrence (1999) suggest more pro-active 
strategies for managing organizational legitimacy and shaping the institutional context 
against which organizational actions are evaluated. From this stock of previous research, 
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Bresser and Millonig (2003) developed a typology of five generic manipulation strategies 
(see table 1), which institutional entrepreneurs may use to shape the rules and norms of their 
institutional environment according to their own interest.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Co-option denotes a strategy of winning over powerful institutional constituents by 
incorporating them into the organization. For example, politicians, trade union 
representatives or investors may be assigned seats on supervisory or directors‟ boards to 
bring them closer to the organization and its interests. This puts co-option at the 
manipulative end of Oliver‟s (1991) strategy continuum. It aims to neutralize or actively 
reduce external institutional constraints and establish the organization and its actions as 
legitimate. Co-opting politicians, for instance, can serve to create institutional capital insofar 
as they can signal legitimacy, lobby legislative bodies, and facilitate access to lucrative 
government contracts.   
Lobbyism is a close relative of co-option. It describes attempts on the part of 
organizations to mobilize external institutional actors as advocates of their own interests. 
However, while co-option primarily seeks to reduce institutional pressures on a specific 
organization, lobbyism is a bi-focal strategy: It can be used to reduce constraints on the 
lobbying organization or to increase institutional pressure on its competitors (Oliver (1991); 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)). 
Membership strategies, as originally described by Lawrence (1999), specify which 
organizations can legitimately exercise particular functions in a social domain. 
Organizations that set membership rules actively manipulate the system of social positions 
in their field by determining the relative ease with which their competitors can enter and 
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access critical resources. These rules can be explicit or implicit as, for example, in the 
professions (Freidson (2001)) or keiretsu networks (Lincoln, Gerlach and Takahashi 
(1992)). Irrespective of their nature, though, membership rules exert normative pressures, 
which organizations must observe to become or remain legitimate members of an 
organizational field.  
Standardization strategies (Lawrence (1999)) aim at establishing specific 
organizational practices, structures, processes, products or services as legitimate and 
“normal” within an organizational field. Organizations try to portray their own 
organizational characteristics as appropriate for all members of the organizational field 
(Greenwood et al. (2002)) by invoking technical, legal/regulatory or more informal norms 
and standards. Establishing its own way of operating as a field-wide standard favours the 
standard-setting organization and enhances its institutional capital. 
Influence in Suchman‟s (1995) sense is the most far-reaching strategy to manipulate 
institutional environments. It extends beyond the context of the organizational field to 
influence norm systems at the societal level. Organizations pursuing this strategy aim to 
build normative and cognitive legitimacy for particular ideas and actions. They reframe an 
existing social reality within which those ideas and actions that suit their organizational 
interests appear acceptable, even taken-for-granted.  
These strategies, aimed at manipulating institutional arrangements at the level of the 
field or society, however, have raised two important questions: First, how do organizations 
become motivated and enabled to act as “institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio (1988)) and 
challenge those institutional rules and norms that supposedly define their interests and scope 
for strategic action? Second, how do organizational actors succeed in manipulating 
institutional arrangements that are supported by broad social consensus? These questions 
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have emerged as fundamental puzzles of institutional theory and attracted growing academic 
attention under the labels of embedded and, more recently, distributed agency. 
2.3 Embedded and Distributed Agency  
With growing interest in institutional change during the 1990s, the “paradox of 
embedded agency” (Holm (1995, 398); Seo and Creed (2002, 225)), the question how 
institutional agents bring about change from within their field, has come to constitute a 
fundamental puzzle for institutional theorists. 
The institutional entrepreneurship literature has predominantly attended to 
dissatisfied and therefore weakly embedded actors as potential change agents (Garud and 
Kumaraswamy (2002); Greenwood and Hinings (1996); Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a); 
Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips (2002); Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King (1991); Maguire 
et al. (2004)). Only recently have institutionalists started to investigate how privileged, 
firmly embedded actors can come to challenge the very norms that they benefit from and 
supposedly take for granted (Greenwood et al. (2002); Sherer and Lee (2002)). Prominently, 
in their study of the Big Five accounting firms, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a) show how 
elite actors can occupy socio-economic positions that make them aware of favourable 
alternative institutional arrangements, motivated to further enhance their competitive 
position by pursuing these alternatives, and largely immune to institutional pressures as 
exerted, for example, by their professional regulators. These insights constitute an important 
step towards disentangling the “paradox of embedded agency”, because they show how 
perceived under-performance and awareness of preferable arrangements motivate - and 
perceived immunity from institutional sanctions - enable organizations to challenge 
supposedly taken-for-granted institutions.  
Simultaneously, this stream of work begins to point out that institutional change may 
be more collective than the imagery of institutional entrepreneurship may previously have 
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suggested. While Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) focus on the interplay of an elite group of 
firms and their regulator, Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) highlight the relevance of an even 
wider array of actors in field-wide practice innovation. They argue that institutional change 
may emerge from multiple, distributed actors engaging in parallel, yet uncoordinated 
activities that may amount to profound field-level change. This perspective may help to 
more realistically describe how institutional strategies play out and how organizations can 
enhance or maintain their institutional capital. 
3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY 
Management knowledge is the central “issue” (Hoffman (1999)) around which the 
consulting field revolves (Engwall and Kipping (2002); Faust (2002a); Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2001)). The creation, dissemination and application of new management 
concepts connects its members into a collective endeavour that makes them “interact more 
frequently and fatefully” (Scott (1994, 208)) with each other than with actors outside their 
“knowledge arena” (Engwall and Kipping (2002); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)). Actors 
with a stake in the management consultancy field include consultancies, their current and 
potential employees, clients in various for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, academic 
institutions, professional associations and media. Consultants, “management gurus” and 
mass media have been recognized as a “fashion-setting community” that coalesces around 
the “dramatization of newness” (Faust (2002a, 146)) and forms the core of a “recognized 
area of institutional life” in the sense of DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983, 148) field concept. 
Intriguingly, authors describe the management consultancy field in terms that 
emphasize both, emerging as well as mature properties. Kipping and Armbrüster (1999) 
highlight that the relatively imprecise nature of the consultancy concept, the multitude of 
specializations, and the frequent change of products and producers complicate the definition 
of field boundaries. Unlike other professional business services like law or accounting, 
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management consulting is not a protected occupation that requires professional certification 
and accreditation (Armbrüster (2006); Groß and Kieser (2006); Kipping and Armbrüster 
(1999)). Industry associations do exist, but play a largely supporting and representative role, 
much in contrast to the formally sanctioned professional associations that regulate the 
practice of lawyers, accountants or physicians. They provide opportunities for training and 
exchange and help small management consultancies to build credibility and reputation 
(Clark (1995); Groß and Kieser (2006)). Accordingly, isomorphic pressures as they are 
commonly exerted by professional associations or the state are weak in the consultancy field 
(Armbrüster (2006); Groß and Kieser (2006)). In this sense, the management consulting 
field is still emerging, providing space for residual institutional ambiguity and allowing 
competing ideas of appropriate consulting practice to coexist. 
Simultaneously, the perceived status of consultancy services as well as the way field 
constituents interact with and perceive of each other show signs of increasing field maturity. 
While management consulting is still a relatively young industry, it has positioned itself as 
“the world‟s newest profession” (McKenna, 2006), attaining quasi-professional status based 
on the knowledge intensity of its services (Brint (1993); Groß and Kieser (2006); Maister 
(1993)). This perceived professionalization of consultancy services, together with  the close 
correlation of professionalization and institutionalization (DiMaggio and Powell (1983)), 
suggests that the field has progressed towards fuller institutionalization. Its large growth 
rates during the 1990s “were being added to a mature frame, not an adolescent skeleton” 
(McKenna (2006, 251)).  
Another indicator of field maturity is the stratification of elites and nonelites or 
central and peripheral field participants that differ in both their scale and reputation 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Similar to the more traditional law (Empson (2007a)) and 
accounting professions (Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a)), the consulting field is clearly 
 13 
stratified along these dimensions, distinguishing a small group of elite organizations from 
their peripheral competitors both in the global and the German context.  
In 2006, the top ten consultancies in Germany (out of approx. 14,250 incumbents) 
controlled a market share of 18 percent.2 With the exception of Roland Berger Strategy 
Consultants as a leading national player, the German consulting market is dominated by the 
global elite of American consulting firms like McKinsey & Co., Booz Allen Hamilton, and 
The Boston Consulting Group. Most of those firms entered the European market in the 
consulting boom of the “golden sixties” (Kipping (1999, 209)) and established the 
significant presence they still enjoy today.  
Hence, while the boundaries of the management consultancy field are relatively 
fuzzy, its centre is very clear. The stratification of elite and non-elite organizations, 
combined with the fluidity of field participation, the absence of strong isomorphic pressures, 
and the resultant institutional ambiguity suggest that management consulting is best 
described as a maturing field. It is caught in limbo between early emergence and full 
structuration. This suggests that processes of institutionalization are ongoing but still leaving 
considerable scope for entrepreneurial actors to shape maturing arrangements in ways that 
enhance their institutional capital. 
In a maturing field, even more than in an emerging field, organizations may find 
particularly motivating and enabling conditions for strategic action. The lack of institutions 
of professionalism (Armbrüster (2006); Groß and Kieser (2006)) creates institutional 
ambiguity and therefore weaker institutional constraints. Additionally, local or global elites 
can use their reputation and resourceful position to shape maturing institutional structures to 
their advantage. Their exposure to top clients and multiple industries helps them reflect on 
existing institutional arrangements (Greenwood and Suddaby (2006a)) and give direction to 
                                                                
2 Calculations based on (BDU (2007)) and (Lünendonk (2008)) 
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their institutional strategies. While these institutional and organizational conditions act as an 
enabler of strategic action, the prospect of increased competitive advantage and economic 
reward acts as a motivator. Given that institutional arrangements privilege the interests of 
their promoters, individual consultancies are motivated to promote rules and structures that 
enhance their institutional capital and competitive advantage. These specific institutional 
conditions suggest the management consultancy field as a particularly rich setting to explore 
strategies for creating and sustaining institutional capital. 
4. CREATING AND SUSTAINING INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL IN THE 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING FIELD 
Drawing on generic strategies (see table 1) by which self-interested actors may 
impose institutional constraints on other field participants (Lawrence (1999)) or relax their 
own (Oliver (1991)), the following sections analyze how consulting firms in Germany 
manipulate their institutional context to enhance their institutional capital. 
4.1 Co-option and Lobbyism  
The customization of consultancy services (Fosstenløkken, Løwendahl and Revang 
(2003)) and the role of networked reputation in acquiring client projects (Glückler and 
Armbrüster (2003)) mean that personal relationships play a strong role in selling 
consultancy services. Marketing measures are often personalized and aimed at the formation 
of networks with decision-makers in client organizations (Armbrüster and Barchewitz 
(2004)). Accordingly, the consultancy field is highly susceptible to personalized institutional 
strategies such as co-option and lobbyism (see Oliver (1991)). In this specific case, co-
option may take one of two forms, depending on whether a stakeholder is imported into the 
consultancy or exported to co-opt an external stakeholder “from within”. 
Because of the relationship-driven nature of their service, management consultancies 
are intent on incorporating employees with existing personal networks into their own 
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business. This is exercised through lateral hires, the hiring of experienced professionals 
from competitors (Kaiser (2004); Ringlstetter and Bürger (2004)). Especially when firms 
move into new areas of practice, experienced professionals that bring their personal 
networks of colleagues and clients may provide a crucial boost for business development 
(Malos and Campion (1995)).  
A derivative of co-option that is specific to consultancies and other professional 
service firms is known as outplacement (Maister (1993)). It does not rely on integrating 
important institutional decision-makers into the organization, but on placing loyal 
employees in client organizations or regulatory agencies. For many consulting firms with an 
“up-or-out” tournament promotion system (Galanter and Palay (1991); Gilson and Mnookin 
(1989)) outplacement has become an institutionalized solution to infusing the organization 
with new ideas, but has “also created a network of former employees who served as 
ambassadors … within other organizations that might otherwise have been wary of 
employing consultants” (McKenna (2006, 208)). The prevalence of the outplacement 
strategy as an instrument for reinforcing consultant-client ties is illustrated by a survey of 
the professional backgrounds of the DAX-30 board members (see table 2)3. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
On average 16 percent of all DAX-30 board members had a background in 
management consulting. The results ranged from zero to 50 percent; figures close to 50 
percent suggest close relationships between the corporation and the consulting field and in 
some cases with a specific consulting firm. Notably, in the chemical or automotive industry, 
                                                                
3 The DAX-30 lists the 30 largest German companies, publicly listed at Frankfurt stock exchange. It is the equivalent to the 
FTSE100 in London or the Dow Jones Index in New York. Information on consulting backgrounds was gathered from 
publicly available executive biographies.  
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where a strong life science or engineering background is desirable even among top 
executives, only one out of 36 board members had a consulting background. Conversely, 
DAX-30 banks recruited one third of their board members from among former management 
consultants.  
By far the most successful firm in outplacing former employees into client 
organizations – given our indicator – is McKinsey & Company4, the industry leader in the 
German consulting market. 43 percent of all former consultants on DAX-30 executive 
boards are former members of McKinsey. More importantly, in exceptional cases like the 
Deutsche Post and the Deutsche Postbank former employees of McKinsey occupy 50 and 44 
percent respectively of the top-management positions. Simultaneously, McKinsey has 
attained an informal status as “consultancy of choice” for both companies, reducing the 
volume of new business that competitors have been able to acquire. In 2006 McKinsey 
generated an annual fee income of an estimated 80 Mill. Euro - accounting for 
approximately 13 percent of total fee income - from this relationship (Lixenfeld (2008); 
Student (2008)). While the survey of DAX-30 companies is indicative, the alumni networks 
of large consultancies reach further. McKinsey‟s German alumni network comprises 
approximately 1,800 managers (Reischauer (2005, 86)) compared to about 1,000 former 
BCG consultants (Student (2006, 32)).  
The prospect of outplacement to prestigious client firms increases the attractiveness 
on the graduate labour market (Reischauer (2005); Student (2006)). It creates institutional 
capital in that it helps attract new talent from leading business schools and fuel the constant 
stream of new entrants that is needed to sustain the up-or-out promotion system. 
Additionally, consultants that have successfully been outplaced with clients can help their 
former employer secure a steady stream of new projects, based on good personal 
                                                                
4 In the following we just refer to McKinsey. 
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relationships and information advantages (Bresser and Millonig (2003); McKenna (2006, 
203-210)). The benefit of these client-consultant ties is mutual, however, as clients can also 
benefit from employing former consultants. Their inside knowledge of their former firm 
allows them to manage service delivery more effectively and to raise performance 
expectations (see Van den Bosch, Baaij and Volberda (2005)). For instance, former 
consultants in client organizations may have maintained good personal relationships to 
partners in the consultancy through whom they can sanction low performing consulting 
work. 
Within New Public Management initiatives, management consultancies are 
increasingly seconding members to government and policy-making committees (Bill and 
Falk (2006); Faust (1998)). A prominent example in Germany is the so-called “Hartz 
Committee” on labour market reform, to which McKinsey and Roland Berger Strategy 
Consultants seconded senior members. Work on policy-making committees builds 
reputation, but more importantly constitutes a deliberate attempt to demonstrate the value of 
consulting services for society. Similar to client outplacements, these temporary 
secondments constitute a form of co-option that enhances consultants‟ institutional capital: 
They create public awareness and legitimacy for consulting work in this sector. Such a 
“committee first, then consulting”-strategy (manager-magazin (2004)) opens up the public 
sector as a new and lucrative market for consulting services. In 2004, public organizations 
spent about one billon Euros on consulting fees, accounting for approximately 8 percent of 
the total German consulting market (Falk, Rehfeld, Römmele and Thunert (2006, 292)).   
These efforts to build institutional capital, however, also had unintended 
consequences that reduced it. As new stakeholders surfaced government watchdogs began to 
scrutinize the government use of management consultancies; journalists and academics 
publicly questioned its legitimacy. The increasing influence of management consultants on 
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political decision-making is met with great scepticism as critics observe the emergence of a 
“republic of consultants” (Leif (2006); Niejahr and Bittner (2004)) in which political 
decision-makers increasingly depend on external consulting expertise. Following a 
resolution of the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag, the Federal Audit Office 
(Bundesrechnungshof) developed guidelines for government relations with, and use of, 
management consultants (Bundesrechnungshof (2006)). Hence, where some elements of the 
institutional environment, but not others, are co-opted to align with organizational interests, 
unintended consequences for firms‟ institutional capital can occur.  
This means that the deliberate competitive or institutional strategies of individual 
firms may entail unintended – positive and negative - consequences that drive an emergent 
process of institutional change. Deliberate and emergent, competitive and institutional 
components of strategy influence each other through feedback loops. For instance, the 
deliberate outplacement of qualified consultants into client organizations solves incentive 
problems of an up-or-out career system, but also creates an emergent pattern of 
organizational actions that may institutionalizes the use of consultancies by clients. 
Similarly, consultants‟ work on policy committees generates fee income and, at the same 
time, creates the incidental by-product that political consulting becomes increasingly 
indispensable and eventually taken-for-granted in the public sphere. 
4.2 Membership 
Membership strategies specify which organizations can legitimately exercise 
particular functions and derive corresponding benefits from their activity. In addition to 
Lawrence‟s (1999) original conceptualization of membership strategies, however, we also 
find distinct non-membership strategies among German management consultancies.  
Small and medium-sized consultancies pursue a membership strategy in Lawrence‟s 
(1999) sense insofar as they organize themselves in industry associations such as the 
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Bundesverband Deutscher Unternehmensberater (BDU) or the RKW Beratungsnetzwerk. 
These associations, serving as substitutes for established professional associations with 
regulatory functions, signal a minimum of consultancy competence and quality to potential 
clients (Groß and Kieser (2006)).  
For leading international consultancies, by contrast, such membership strategies are 
counter-productive. In the absence of a protected occupational title and formal professional 
accreditation, reputation serves as a proxy for quality. Hence, elite firms can use their 
reputation as “membership criterion” and form a strategic group (McGee and Thomas 
(1986)) of management consultancies defined by elite status (Ferguson, Deephouse and 
Ferguson (2000)). Their rigorous and strict demands serve to maintain the exclusivity of 
their circle and to establish a company-specific “micro-profession”, which is reinforced by 
in-house monitoring of quasi-professional principles (McKenna (2006))5. This legitimation-
qua-reputation gives elite consultancies access to knowledge and policy-making arenas in 
which best practices are created, validated, or diffused (Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)).  
By steering clear of more inclusive industry associations, elite firms avoid 
reputational contamination and external institutional influence. In this sense, they pursue a 
non-membership or exclusivity strategy to enhance their individual institutional capital and 
weaken that of their smaller competitors. 
4.3 Standardization 
Standardization strategies aim to define what is to be seen as normal, for example for 
a particular service. In this respect, membership and standardization strategies are 
interdependent, since both promote and eventually institutionalize coherent standards of 
professional practice and service quality. Those consultancies promoting a standard – and 
                                                                
5 For instance, McKinsey & Co‟s firm-specific network alone, composed of 14,500 active consultants and 18.000 alumni 
(McKinsey (2008a)), encompasses more members than the BDU representing 530 firms covering 13,000 individual 
consultants (BDU (2009)). This allows McKinsey to act as a one-firm micro-profession. 
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most likely already complying with it – automatically gain legitimacy advantages and 
enhance their institutional capital.  
For instance, in an attempt to strengthen the collective reputation and legitimacy of 
the consulting profession, the BDU filed a request to the Ministry of Economics to protect 
the title Unternehmensberater (management consultant) by occupational law. According to 
the proposal, the title Unternehmensberater should have been awarded conditional upon 
specific credentials such as academic training or practical experience. In December 1997, 
however, the proposal was finally rejected by the ministry (Glückler and Armbrüster (2003, 
272); Groß and Kieser (2006); Handelsblatt (1997)).  
In line with their non-membership strategy, elite consultancy firms with a strong 
position in their particular fields can use more subtle standardization strategies to enhance 
their individual, rather than collective, institutional capital. They can aim to raise those 
practices, procedures and products in which they have competitive advantages to the status 
of an institution. In this context, the creation of management fashions constitutes a 
standardization strategy. It at least temporarily institutionalizes concepts or practices by 
ascribing them a value over and above their technical merit (Lawrence (1999)). Although 
fashions are transitory rationality myths and only weakly institutionalized, they are 
nonetheless regarded as standards in their respective areas for the duration of their life-cycle. 
Their technical merit is not evaluated strictly by goal attainment, as their application confers 
benefits of perceived conformity with super-ordinate norms of rationality and progress 
(Benders and van Veen (2001); Kieser (1997); Suddaby and Greenwood (2001)). 
Consultancies as “expert theorizers” (Strang and Meyer (1993, 498)) occupy 
privileged positions in “reality-defining arenas” (Seo and Creed (2002, 242)) where the 
legitimacy of competing management innovations is constructed and contested. Within these 
arenas, their status enhances the impact and “positive normative emulation” of their ideas 
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(Suchman (1995, 579)). As such, management fashions become important standardization 
devices of socially constructed business solutions. A consultancy that successfully 
establishes its own concepts or procedures as temporary standard enhances its own 
institutional capital, because it develops market preferences that constrain its competitors. 
They are forced to adapt and subscribe to concepts or procedures in which they are at a 
technical disadvantage. Simultaneously, as the use specific consulting services becomes a 
more standardized response to certain management problems, the standardization efforts of 
individual firms can build collective institutional capital for the entire industry.  
4.4 Influence 
Generally, successful marketing of consultancy services depends on a positive 
perception of the engagement of consultants in the target industry. Strategic influence on 
such a fundamental attitude can endow consultancy services with normative and eventually 
cognitive legitimacy (Suchman (1995); Røvik (2002)). 
There is clear evidence that consultancy firms have in the past successfully 
influenced the value systems of their clients, but also of society at large, so that their 
services in support of management teams and policy makers have become taken for granted 
and rarely questioned as such (Falk et al. (2006); Faust (1998); McKenna (2006); Wimmer 
(1992)). These observations strongly resonate with Meyer and Rowan‟s (1977) argument 
that the modernization of society makes more areas of society accessible to the rules of 
rationality. Management consultancies have been able to use and propel this trend by 
reaching out to new groups of potential clients and applying their expertise to new types of 
problems which traditionally had not been open to their services (Ernst and Kieser (2002c); 
Rudolph (2004)).  
Influencing strategies may involve other strategies of institutional manipulation such 
as outplacement and secondment strategies. However, they may be more wide-ranging, 
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especially where firms try to influence societal value systems more generally and open up 
new markets. 
In the business sector, consulting firms can rely on their “systems of persuasion” 
(Alvesson (1993, 1011)) to create institutionalized myths that buffer their existence and 
operation from questioning. Based on a study of self-presentations by various global 
management consultancies on the internet, Bäcklund and Werr (2001) conclude that 
management consultancies use prevalent social myths of rationality, globalization, and 
universality to institutionalize their services as necessary components of successful 
management. 
To influence value systems outside their traditional „management‟ domain, 
consultancies can employ secondment strategies to demonstrate their value for political 
decision-making. Active engagement in social and environmental issues has also become an 
important mission for a large number of businesses that put corporate social responsibility 
and corporate citizenship high on their agenda. Management consultancies can display their 
social responsibility through “pro bono” work, the delivery of services for projects of social 
relevance free of charge (e.g. BCG (2008); McKinsey (2008b); Roland-Berger (2008a)). 
However, these initiatives also provide a strong platform for more wide-ranging societal 
strategies. 
From the institutionalist perspective, pro bono work not only builds reputation as a 
socially responsible organization. More importantly, it creates impressions of ubiquity 
which may be taken as an indicator of acceptance and legitimacy. Pro bono work gives 
consultancy firms a legitimate presence in social domains that were previously not 
accessible to them due to incompatible value systems. Especially the large, elite 
consultancies have developed their status as the new “reflective elite“ (Deutschmann (1993); 
Faust (2002a)) or the “supra-experts” (Ernst and Kieser (2002a)) by applying their expertise 
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pro bono to societal problems as diverse as climate protection (McKinsey (2007)), 
restructuring the church (see Hardt (2004); Neidhart (1997)), national innovation systems 
(BCG (2006)), and city attractiveness (Roland-Berger (2008b)). These initiatives counter 
negative public perceptions of consultants as hyper-rational cost-cutters, build a legitimate 
basis of activity for consultancies in a wide range of societal sectors and thereby develop 
their individual and collective institutional capital. Consultancies‟ individual efforts to 
manage their reputation collectively drive the institutionalization of management 
consultancy throughout society.  
It should be pointed out, however, that the influencing strategy cannot be seen in 
isolation from other, super-ordinate institutional arrangements. For instance, from a 
historical perspective, it is clear that the influence of management consultancies in societies 
with traditional values of status, prestige, and authority is lower than in meritocratic 
societies which stress functional values of effectiveness and efficiency (Faust (2002b)). An 
important question therefore is, to what extent changes in social values can be influenced by 
individual institutional entrepreneurs.  
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Unlike the “classic” professions such as accountancy or law, management 
consultancy is distinguished by institutional ambiguity and weakly entrenched, relatively 
localized “proto-institutions” (Lawrence et al. (2002)). Thus, consultancies are in the 
advantageous position that restrictive institutional pressures are relatively weak, while, the 
relative maturity and stratification of the field has produced a central elite, which enjoys 
entrepreneurial freedom to influence emerging institutions by virtue of their size and 
reputation. Drawing on discussions of institutional capital (Oliver, 1997) and its strategic 
manipulation (Bresser and Millonig, 2003; Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991) we have 
elaborated five strategies by which management consultancies can manipulate their 
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institutional environment in ways that help them extract competitive resources. Table 3 
summarizes these strategies along with the practices through which they are implemented in 
the consultancy field, and the institutional effects they seek to generate.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Co-option/lobbyism represents the most effective strategy for management 
consultancies. It can be used in isolation or in pursuit of a broader influence strategy and 
plays a major part in the institutionalization of consultancy services. By comparison, the 
membership and standardization strategies are relatively weak instruments, because 
membership in industry associations is voluntary and standards may only confer temporary 
advantages before new concepts or practices become fashionable..  
Changes in the institutional capital of individual consultancies and the consultancy 
sector as a whole are influenced by a complex interplay of distributed actors, existing 
systems of norms and values, and super-ordinate trends such as the modernization of 
society. Hence, it is impossible to reduce changes in the societal value system – as they are, 
for example, necessary to open up non-profit sectors like politics or environmentalism for 
consulting services - to initiatives of single organizations. As entrepreneurs challenge 
“widely accepted rules of the game” (DiMaggio and Powell (1991, 30)) sustained by broad 
social consensus rather than coercive authorities, they must gradually mobilize broader sets 
of actors. Management consultancies can pursue this strategy by initially focusing on 
relevant target industries that they can later use as their advocates when trying to manipulate 
broader societal value systems. A target industry of this kind, for example public 
administration, can be addressed at first by measures focused on one client, anticipating  far-
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reaching multiplier effects which can eventually lead to a sector-wide or society-wide shift 
in values. 
For the development of institutional theory, this has several interrelated implications: 
First, our discussion of institutional strategies in the German management consultancy field 
finds a less voluntaristic role of instititutional entrepreneurs than previous accounts have 
suggested. The co-presence of multiple actors like consulting firms, the media, clients, 
business schools and industry associations with different levels of involvement implies that 
agency is distributed across actors. There is typically no centralized control in the consulting 
field, since no single agency with a monopolized power position exists to dictate the 
behaviour of other agents. Hence, collective behaviour has to be understood as the result of 
self-organized actors interacting with their local environment, but creating global patterns of 
action as a by-product. The creation of management fashions, for example, cannot be 
understood as an individual endeavour but is rather the collective achievement of non-
orchestrated, distributed agents that resemble a social movement. This understanding of 
institutional change initiatives as distributed agency (Garud and Karnøe (2003); Quack 
(2007)) rather than individualistic entrepreneurship sheds new light on institutional strategy 
formation. 
Second, with multiple localized actors contributing to an institutional change, the 
formation of institutional strategies may be better understood as an interplay of emergent 
and deliberate actions. As Mintzberg (1987a; 1987b) suggests, strategies need not be 
deliberate, but can also emerge from incremental and distributed patterns of actions. 
Although these have generally been viewed as mutually exclusive opposites, Quack (2007) 
has found institution building to involve both, practitioners‟ practical problem solving and 
firms‟ deliberate political interventions. It appears that in our accounts institutional 
strategies are the result of a complex interplay between deliberate sets of actions that 
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individual consulting firms deploy to enhance their competitive position and emerging 
patterns of collective actions that produce institutional change through complex feedback 
loops with other actors in the field. For instance, by deliberately outplacing loyal consultants 
into client organizations, close business relations may evolve into taken-for-granted 
institutionalized work practices between the two organizations. Furthermore, consulting 
firm‟s participation in political committees is a deliberate attempt to enhance revenues, but 
also build firm-specific institutional capital by enhancing reputation. Beyond that, industry-
specific institutional capital emerges as political consulting becomes legitimized as a new 
field of activity. 
Future research potential along these lines exists in the continued development of an 
institutionalist theory of management consultancy. Our own contribution should be 
understood as a first theoretical step in this direction. Further empirical research should be 
pursued to analyze different strategies for building up institutional capital, to uncover 
differences between different strategic groups of management consultancy firms, and to 
identify the constituent forms of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby (2006)) that are 
used in specific institutional contexts.  
Insights from such an empirical study would also inform institutionalist theory on 
maturing fields. Such a study is intrinsically interesting, because it would allow 
institutionalists to understand the gradual structuration of fields through a “cumulative 
history of action and interaction” (Barley and Tolbert (1997, 98)). Evidently, the 
consultancy field provides an instrumental and rich setting for exploring the motivations, 
abilities, and activities of institutional agents creating and modifying institutional 
arrangements. A better understanding of their strategies and the institutional conditions 
under which they are to be employed will, hence, help produce a richer institutional theory 
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of consultancy firms and their institutional capital as well as practical advice about strategies 
to strategically enhance and maintain it. 
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Table 1: Effects of generic manipulation strategies  
 
Strategy Effect 
Co-option Neutralizing institutional constraints 
Lobbyism Dismantling/creating of institutional constraints 
Membership Creating institutional constraints 
Standardization Creating institutional constraints 
Influence Influencing societal value systems 
Source: based on Bresser; Millonig (2003, 235),  
Oliver (1991, 152), Lawrence (1999, 168) . 
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Table 2: Percentage of board members with consulting background  
of the DAX-30 corporations in Germany in 2007  
Firms 
 
% of board 
members with 
consulting 
background 
Consulting firms 
 
Adidas 50% Ernst & Young, GfK 
Deutsche Post 50% McKinsey 
Deutsche Postbank 44% McKinsey 
Deutsche Börse 33% 
BCG, Bain, Roland Berger*, 
Anderson Consulting 
Deutsche Lufthansa 33% BDO 
SAP 33% ABP Partners, PWC 
Commerzbank 25% BCG, McKinsey 
Deutsche Bank 25% KPMG 
Münchener Rückversicherung 25% Roland Berger, firm unstated 
Deutsche Telekom 20% Mummert + Partner 
DaimlerChrysler 17% KPMG 
E.ON 16% McKinsey 
Fresenius  16% McKinsey 
Henkel 16% KPMG 
Continental 14% Arthur D. Little 
Allianz 13% McKinsey 
ThyssenKrupp 13% PWC 
Siemens 9% Kienbaum 
BASF -- -- 
Bayer -- -- 
BMW -- -- 
Hypo Real Estate Holding -- -- 
Infineon -- -- 
Linde -- -- 
MAN -- -- 
Merck -- -- 
Metro -- -- 
RWE -- -- 
TUI -- -- 
Volkswagen -- -- 
Source: based on Datamonitor and publicly available CV information 
* board member with former positions at multiple consulting firms. 
 34 
Table 3: Strategies of consulting firms for creating and sustaining institutional capital 
Mutual 
effects  Strategy 
Practices of  
consulting firms 
Explanation from an 
institutionalist point of view 
 
Co-option/ 
Lobbyism 
 networking 
 outplacement 
 work on commissions 
institutionalization of firm‟s own 
consultancy service 
 Membership 
 professional associations, 
professional principles 
 networks in knowledge 
arenas 
 exclusive group of major 
management consultancy 
firms 
 creating institutional 
constraints for non-members 
 institutionalization of 
concepts 
 circumvention of institutional 
constraints 
 Standardization  standardizing business 
problems and solutions 
 influencing the knowledge 
and fashion discourses 
 
(temporary) institutionalization of 
company‟s own concepts 
 Influence 
 influencing the value 
systems of target 
industries 
 use of trends 
 use of multiplier effects 
 
establishment of a value system 
for one‟s own services 
 
 
 
 
